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Abstract:   
We propose a DSGE model with income heterogeneity to help discriminate across 
competing explanations of the cross-sectional divergence in debt-to-income ratios in US 
data. We show that for a DSGE model to be consistent with the data, the divergence in 
income growth should not be anticipated and should happen in an economy with low 
cost of access to financial intermediation. Differential productivity growth across the top 
and bottom-income quantile of the population has a much smaller impact on debt 
accumulation by the bottom income-quantile relative to a cross-sectional tax 
reallocation. 
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1. Introduction
This paper uses a DSGE model to discuss the impact of changing cross-sectional in-
come diﬀerentials on the cross-sectional dynamics of consumption and debt. Growing
income inequality in the US has been documented by several authors (Krueger, Perri,
Pistaferri and Violante, 2008, Lemieux, 2006). Piketty and Saez (2003) find that most
of the relative rise in income since 1970 was concentrated at the very top of the income
distribution, around 1%. In their influential work, Krueger and Perri (2006) argued that
consumption inequality in the US had risen much less than inequality. The divergence
in the consumption inequality to income inequality ratio is still the subject of an open
debate (Aguiar and Bils, 2011, Attanasio, Hurst and Pistaferri, 2012).
An increase in consumption inequality relative to income inequality should be re-
flected in an increase in total debt. In a model with idiosyncratic income shocks, an
increase in income volatility leads agents to smooth consumption over time by increas-
ing their trading of financial assets. After the US financial crisis, the popular press has
often linked the increase in the gross level of household debt to a growing divergence in
consumption inequality relative to income inequality.
Household-level data from the Survey of Consumer Finance show that the well-
documented rise in household debt over the last 25 years was concentrated below the
90th percentile of the income distribution. Figure 1 illustrates that the cross sectional
dispersion in the rise of the debt-to-income ratio occurred not only for mortgage debt,
but also for uncollateralized categories of debt.
There is only a limited body of work examining the relation between income inequal-
ity, debt inequality and debt accumulation in the context of DSGE models. Iacoviello
(2008) builds a model with idiosyncratic income shocks and collateralized borrowing to
explain the behaviour of US household debt and consumption-to-wealth ratio. Kumhof
and Ranciere (2012) model an economy where income inequality is the result of shocks
changing the distribution of revenues between workers and employers, leading to a higher
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probability of a financial crisis over time.
We propose a simple DSGEmodel where heterogeneity in income and consumption is
introduced through initial productivity diﬀerentials across two groups of agent. Changes
in consumption and income inequality are the result of diﬀerentiated shocks across the
top and bottom quantile of the income distribution. We use our model to assess the
implications for consumption inequality and borrowing across income groups in response
to an exogenous increase in income inequality. Our model is flexible enough to help
discriminate across competing explanations of the cross-sectional divergence in debt-
to-income and consumption-to-income ratios in US data. To this end, we consider
alternative setups where temporary but long-lived shocks provide an incentive to agents
to reallocate consumption intertemporally by using financial markets.
Our results are as follows. First, income inequality driven by cross-sectional diﬀeren-
tial productivity growth generates much less divergence in the consumption inequality
to income inequality ratio than income inequality driven by a cross-sectional tax real-
location. The increase in the debt to income ratio for the bottom income group in the
case of a tax reallocation is about 100% after 10 years, and only about a fifth in the case
of diﬀerential productivity growth. This result depends on the fact that productivity
diﬀerentials also lead to relative price changes for the goods produced by the two groups
of agents. In the case of a tax reallocation, the increase in demand by the top income
group results in an increase in labor demand for the bottom income group which has
only a mild impact on income inequality. Second, a smaller increase in consumption
inequality relative to income inequality - and the implied debt increase for the bottom
income group - is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the divergence in income growth
across groups can be forecasted to increases over time. This would imply that con-
sumption for the top income group increases  of income, and that indebtedness
increases faster for this group relative to the bottom income group. Third, even a mod-
est amount of financial intermediation cost reduces dramatically the impact of income
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inequality on the divergence in consumption-income inequality and debt accumulation
in the bottom income quantile.
2. A Simple Model
Consider an economy populated by two groups of agents, workers and entrepreneurs,
with diﬀerent labor productivity. We label entrepreneurs () the high-productivity
group, with an income in the top quantile of the distribution, and workers ( ) the
low-productivity group. Variables pertaining the behaviour of entrepreneur-households,
or of firms producing output with entrepreneur-hours, are denoted by a ’∗’ superscript.
No superscripts is used for variables pertaining to worker-households, or firms using
worker-hours. A firm  employing labor services () produces output () demanded
by both groups of agents. We define the consumption by entrepreneurs and workers
of goods produced by firms using worker-hours respectively as ∗() () Thus
the index  indicates the group supplying the good, while the superscript refers to the
group demanding the good. We discuss in the following the equations for the bottom
income group only. The top income group behaviour is governed by an identical set of
equations.
Worker-households supply labor hours with productivity  and consume a basket
 of diﬀerentiated goods produced by firms using the  and  groups labor services:
 = [(1
2
1

()
−1
+
1
2
1

()
−1
]

−1  (2.1)
,  and  indicate the price indices for the aggregate,  and  goods consump-
tion basket. Preferences for the worker-household are described by the function:
 =
(
ln − 
1+

1 + 
)

Households maximize the expected discounted utility flow subject to eq. (2.1) and the
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budget constraint:
 + +  e +  
2
Ã e

!2
≤ +−1 + e−1 +  (2.2)
where  is the price of a zero-coupon riskless bond delivering one unit of currency, e is
the amount of asset purchased,  is the wage rate, and  is a lump sum government
transfer. e−1 indicates the value of the household portfolio of claims. The term 2 ³  ´2
indicates the real cost of adjusting bond holdings, which is quadratic in the value of the
portfolio in terms of consumption units.
Defining the gross nominal interest rate  = 1  the gross inflation rate  and
the value of bond holdings in consumption units  =   the optimality conditions are
given by:
 0(1 + ) = 
∙
() 1+1
0+1
¸
(2.3)
 =  
0 (2.4)
Firms specialize in the production of  goods (using labor ) or  goods (using
labor ∗ ) employing the technology: () = ()1 Firms are competitive and the
cost minimization problem implies that
 =  (2.5)
Since shocks across the two income groups can be asymmetric, there is an incentive for
high and low income agents to exchange financial assets. Market clearing on the asset
markets implies:
 = −∗ 
Borrowing allows one income group to purchase output for consumption from the sector
using as input the labor services of the other income group, in excess of its current
1This assumption allows for the nominal and real wage to be diﬀerent across income groups.
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income. 2 The budget constraint implies the excess of spending over income for worker-
households, denoted is equal to the output sold by entrepreneurs to workers,
net of the value of the output produced by workers and purchased by the top income
group. After including the net interest income, we obtain that the change in the net
financial asset position for the bottom income group is:
∆ =  − −1
= (−1 − 1) ∗ (−1 )− 
and
 = 
∗
 ∗
 ∗
  −

 
∗
Our measure of inequality in consumption and in income is given by:
 = 
∗ −
  = [ ]
where  is total income. We plot the inequality variable in deviations from steady
state: b = (∗ −)− (∗ −)  = [ ]
Thus b has the interpretation of change in inequality between  and ∗ relative to
steady state, as a percentage of the bottom quantile income level.
To measure the evolution of the distance between consumption and income inequal-
ity, we build the variable  Since at the steady state  =   the
deviation from steady state of the relative consumption to income inequality is equal to
\µ 

¶

=
( − )− ( − )

=
( − )

2An income group can always purchase all the output produced with its labor services, since all the
payments to the inputs are rebated to households.
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Thus
\³  ´ has the interpretation of the excess change in consumption inequality
relative to income inequality, scaled as a percentage of the steady state income inequality.
3. Dynamics for Inequality and Debt
We consider a parameterization with an elasticity of labor supply 1 equal to 13
and an elasticity of substitution across goods  = 15 The parameter  is chosen so
that a level of borrowing equal to 100% of the income for low-income group results in
premium over the riskless interest rate of around 0125 percentage points. We assume
in the initial condition entrepreneur-households’ income is 45% higher than the one of
worker-households. Consumption inequality in the steady state is identical to income
inequality.
Alternative Transitory Shocks Figure 2 compares the dynamics of the economy for
two shocks driving a wedge between income and consumption inequality. The first shock
we consider is a temporary increase in the productivity of labor ∗ for the top income
group. This shocks interprets the rising income inequality as the result of divergence in
productivity growth across income groups.
The second shock we consider is a transfer of resources from the bottom to the top
income group. Define the net tax rate   ≥ 0 The value of the subsidy to entrepreneur-
households, financed with lump sum taxes on worker-households, is equal to:
 ∗ =   ∗
 ∗
 ∗ 
Income in consumption units for the two groups is:
∗ =  ∗
 ∗
 ∗ + 
∗ = (1 +  ) ∗
 ∗
 ∗
 =  ∗ −
 ∗
 
∗ 
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Net financial asset accumulation for the bottom income group is then:
∆ =  − − 
∗
 
∗ 
In this instance, rising income inequality can interpreted as the result of a change in
taxation favoring higher than median incomes. It could also be interpreted as the result
of the fall in negotiating power for workers with below-median wages, working in sectors
open to international competition, relative to workers with above median wages. We
scale the two shocks so that income ∗ increases on impact by 10% and the shock
has a half-life of 20 years.
In the case of an increase in productivity for entrepreneur-households, all agents
in the economy have an incentive, through the relative price of  and  goods, to
substitute in the consumption basket the relatively inexpensive good  for the relatively
expensive one  . Since the productivity shock raises income only for entrepreneur-
households, the bottom income group increases its indebtedness to take advantage of
a temporarily lower price of the consumption basket  and consumption inequality
increases less than income inequality. After 10 years, the total borrowing of the bottom
quantile has increased to about 20% of its income.
The transfer shock provides diﬀerent incentives to smooth consumption over time.
Since the transfer is temporary, both income groups do not change the amount of
consumption by the full amount of the income change. For worker-households, income
falls by more than consumption, while the opposite is true for entrepreneur-households.
However, worker-households also benefit by the demand increase for the  good by
entrepreneur-households, thus their labor income increases.
The transfer shock generates fall in consumption inequality to income inequality
which is about four times as large as the productivity shock, keeping constant the
increase in the entrepreneurs’ income. As a consequence, after 10 years the net debt of
the bottom income group has increased to 100% of its income.
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Comparing Expected vs. Unexpected Income Divergence Income inequality
in the US has steadily increased starting in the 1980s. We can use our model to analyze
the impact of a steady increase in income inequality, where resources are transferred
to the top quantile at a higher rate until the transfer peaks at 10% of ∗ after 15
years.
The dynamics resulting from a transfer shock of this sort, shown in figure 3, is
inconsistent with the data. Since there are expectations of future increases in income,
entrepreneur-households find it optimal to borrow. Thus consumption inequality should
increase  of income inequality, and the bottom income group would accumulate
an enormous credit towards the top income group for the first 10 years of the shock.
The model suggests that the data are consistent with a series of unexpected temporary
shocks, or with myopic households (in both income groups).
Access to Financial Markets The result of a divergence between consumption in-
equality and income inequality relies on the possibility of risk sharing through the trad-
ing of financial assets. To assess the role of access to the financial market, we consider an
economy where the cost of adjusting the portfolio of financial assets is 10 times higher:
to carry a debt equal to its steady state income, a worker-entrepreneur would see the
quarterly interest rate rise from 1% to 225%
Figure 4 compares the impact of a transfer shock under the high and low cost of ac-
cess to financial markets. The increase in the cost of asset trading implies the divergence
between consumption and income inequality falls by two thirds. While consumption in-
equality by one-fifth, the amount of borrowing by the bottom income group falls by
four-fifths. Intuitively, the outstanding debt position cumulates the consumption to
income inequality diﬀerence over each period, so that borrowing is much more sensitive
than consumption inequality to constraints in the possibility of risk sharing.
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4. Conclusions
We use a DSGE model with income heterogeneity to help discriminate across competing
explanations of the cross-sectional divergence in debt-to-income and consumption-to-
income ratios in US data. We show that for a DSGE model to be consistent with the
dynamics over time of these variables, the divergence in income growth should not be
anticipated, and should happen in an economy with a low cost of access to financial
intermediation. As for the driving force of the observed debt-to-income ratio divergence
across income groups, our model shows that cross-sectional diﬀerential productivity
growth has a much smaller impact than a cross-sectional tax reallocation. While our
approach describes the evolution of net debt, future models should address the joint
evolution of net worth and gross debt across income quantiles, since borrowing for
consumption smoothing purposes depends on the amount of borrowing available overall
to households, including collateralized mortgages.
References
[1] Aguiar, M. and M. Bils, 2011. Has consumption inequality mirrored income inequal-
ity. NBER Working Paper no. 16807.
[2] Attanasio, O., Hurst, E. and L. Pistaferri, 2012. The Evolution of Income, Con-
sumption, and Leisure Inequality in The US. NBER Working Paper no. 17982.
[3] Iacoviello, M. 2008. Household Debt and Income Inequality, 1963—2003. Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking 40(5), 929-965.
[4] Krueger, D. and F. Perri, 2006. Does Income Inequality Lead to Consumption In-
equality? Evidence and Theory. Review of Economic Studies 73(1), 163-193.
[5] Krueger, D., Perri, F., Pistaferri, L. and G.L. Violante, 2008. Cross Sectional Facts
for Macroeconomists. Review of Economic Dynamics 13(1), 1-4.
9
[6] Kumhof, M. and R. Ranciere, 2011. Inequality, Leverage and Crises. CEPR Discus-
sion Paper No. 8179.
[7] Lemieux, T., 2006. “Increasing Residual Wage Inequality: Composition Eﬀects,
Noisy Data, or Rising Demand for Skill? American Economic Review 96(3), 461-498.
[8] Piketty, T. and E. Saez, 2013. Income inequality in the United States, 1913—1998.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1), 1-41.
[9] Rajan, R., 2010. Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Econ-
omy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
10
Figure 4.1: Debt to income ratio from the Survey of Consumer Finances, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve, 1989 to 2010. Each data points provides the average
debt to income ratio for the income quantile.
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Figure 4.2: Impulse response function to a 10% increase in income for the top income
quantile. Comparison across a productivity increase for entrepreneur-households rela-
tive to worker-households and a lump-sum transfer from bottom to top income group.
Log-deviations from steady state in percent. Financial asset position shown as percent-
age of steady state income.
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Figure 4.3: Impulse response function to expected growth in income for the top income
group up to 110% of steady state income in year 15. Income growth financed through
lump-sum transfer from bottom to top income group. Log-deviations from steady state
in percent. Financial asset position shown as percentage of steady state income.
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Figure 4.4: Impulse response function to a 10% increase in income for the top quantile.
Income growth financed through lump-sum transfer from bottom to top income group.
Comparison of baseline case and high cost of asset trading case. Log-deviations from
steady state in percent. Financial asset position shown as percentage of steady state
income.
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